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Procedural Rules of International Water Law and the Imminent 
Challenges of the Ecosystem Approach 
Owen McIntyre 
Abstract: As the normative implications of emerging obligations to protect and preserve the 
ecosystems of transboundary watercourses become more clearly understood, the established 
procedural rules of international water law will be severely challenged. The current procedural 
rules and mechanisms, which have evolved to facilitate effective inter-State engagement 
regarding economic utilisation of shared waters, will struggle to accommodate key elements of 
the so-called “ecosystem approach”, including emerging obligations regarding environmental 
flows and the ecosystem services paradigm. In particular, the established rules will prove 
unequal to the procedural requirements of adaptive management techniques for maintaining 
ecological resilience, of broad and meaningful stakeholder and public participation in decision-
making, and of complex benefit-sharing arrangements to ensure optimal and sustainable 
utilisation of shared water resources. While the ecosystem approach holds great promise for the 
resolution of inter-State water disputes, it is increasingly apparent that the procedural rules and 
mechanisms of international water law will need to shift away from one-time inter-State 
communication processes conducted in anticipation of planned water-related developments, and 
towards more sophisticated continuing procedural engagement focused on ensuring the optimal 
and sustainable functioning of valuable watercourse ecosystems. 
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1 Introduction 
Recent developments in international water law highlight the pivotal role of procedural rules in 
the avoidance and resolution of complex inter-State disputes concerning shared waters and, more 
generally, their central importance in facilitating the cooperative communication and 
engagement required to achieve optimal beneficial and sustainable utilisation of ever scarcer 
water resources. Despite the inherent, and arguably necessary and intended, normative 
indeterminacy of the key substantive rules and principles of international water law, the 
procedural rules are increasingly clearly understood, and the engagement thereby enabled offers 
basin States the opportunity to identify mutually acceptable normative boundaries for the use, 
management and protection of international waters and related ecosystems. However, the 
enormous challenges presented by ever increasing global water demand and scarcity, and the 
related risk of watercourse ecosystems degradation, require significantly more intense procedural 
engagement among basin States, for which the current procedural frameworks appear wholly 
inadequate. Exploring the increasingly critical challenge of protecting international watercourse 
ecosystems while seeking to optimise the beneficial use of scarce water resources, this chapter 
highlights how established procedural frameworks fall short in the face of the emerging demands 
of emerging approaches for effective management of watercourse ecosystems in a water-scarce 
era. This represents a significant shortcoming, as various methodologies associated with the 
ecosystem approach offer a usefulthe means of identifying, quantifying and reconciling the 
competing interests of States at issue in international water disputes. 
Whereas the pollution control requirements included in Part IV of the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention1 reflect longer established rules in international water law, the rapidly 
evolving obligation of ecosystems protection is likely to transform and define international water 
law in the years to come. This almost universally recognised obligation has fuelled demands for 
a far-reaching “ecosystem approach” to transboundary water resources management, which 
reflects growing awareness of watercourses as complex and fragile ecosystems providing a range 
of indispensable ecosystem services and requiring holistic management of a wide variety of 
interconnected ecological elements. Whilst it remains true that ‘the precise implications of an 
obligation to protect the ecosystems of international watercourses are not altogether clear’,2 it is 
nevertheless apparent that the complex and severe threats facing freshwater ecosystems globally3 
require a sophisticated legal response, such as that intended in the ecosystem approach. Such 
threats include, inter alia, ever rising demand for water, food and energy and associated large-
scale water resources utilisation,4 as well as the ecological challenges posed by climate change 
 
1 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (adopted 
21 May 1997, entered into force 17 August 2014) 36 ILM 700 (UN Watercourses 
Convention). The ‘UN Watercourses Convention’ can be regarded as largely embodying 
the ‘state of the art’ in international water law. 
2 Stephen C McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 458. 
3 See Sabine Brels, David Coates and Flavia Loures, Transboundary Water Resource 
Management: the Role of International Watercourse Agreements in Implementation of 
the CBD (Secretariat of the CBD 2008) 5. 
4 See eg Edith Brown Weiss, International Water Law for a Water-Scarce World (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2013) 1. 
and the adaptation measures required to address it.5 These challenges might easily foment 
international disputes concerning over-utilised waters. 
The evolving ecosystem approach offers the prospect of a sophisticated response that can 
facilitate integrative management of shared water resources taking account of diverse uses of 
water and land that may impact upon the functioning of aquatic ecosystems, one that can be 
adaptive in response to new threats and new insights into ecosystems dynamics and vulnerability, 
and one that pursues equitable benefit-sharing informed by inclusive participatory decision-
making. Indeed, the continuing elaboration of the ecosystem approach and of its constitutive 
elements may eventually prove crucial to effective realisation of the fundamental objective of 
international water law, i.e. the optimal and sustainable use of shared water resources, at a time 
when the looming problem of freshwater scarcity has come to be recognised as ‘the new 
environmental crisis of the 21st century’.6 However, if it is to realise its potential for the 
avoidance and resolution of international disputes, the ecosystem approach will also require a 
fundamental reassessment of the adequacy of the established legal frameworks, procedural and 
institutional, for facilitating meaningful inter-State communication over the cooperative 
management of shared basins. 
 
5 See eg Alistaur Rieu-Clarke, Ruby Moynihan and Bjørn-Oliver Magsig, Transboundary Water 
Governance and Climate Change Adaptation: International Law, Policy Guidelines and 
Best Practice Application (UNESCO 2015). 
6 See Brown Weiss (n 4) 1, citing 2030 Water Resources Group, Charting our Water Future: 
Economic frameworks to inform decision-making (2030 Water Resources Group 2009) 5. 
2 Procedural Rules of International Water Law – the Current 
Consensus 
Nobody could doubt the absolutely central role of procedural rules within the cooperative 
framework currently provided by international water law, as these relatively unambiguous rules 
require the structured exchange of information which is so vital to any meaningful inter-State 
engagement. Though their significance for inter-State cooperation has long enjoyed judicial and 
arbitral recognition,7 in its 2010 judgment in the Pulp Mills case the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) placed great emphasis on the functional importance of procedural requirements, 
whether conventional or customary, and did much to clarify the inter-relationship between 
procedural and substantive rules of international water law.8 For the purposes of determining a 
breach of either of the key substantive principles of international water law, that of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation and that of prevention of significant transboundary harm, the Court 
identified two categories of due diligence obligation inherent to both – procedural and 
substantive – and clearly linked the duty to notify, and the closely associated obligation to 
conduct transboundary environmental impact assessment of planned projects, to satisfaction of 
 
7 Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v France) (1957) 24 ILR 101; (1957) 12 RIAA 281; (1958) 
RGDIP; (1959) 53 AJIL 156. 
8 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14. See 
generally, Owen McIntyre, ‘The contribution of procedural rules to the environmental 
protection of transboundary rivers in light of recent ICJ case law’ in Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes, Christina Leb and Mara Tignino (eds), Freshwater and International Law: 
The Multiple Challenges (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2013) 239 –265. 
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the procedural due diligence obligations.9 In addition to their role in informing compliance with 
the substantive obligations, the Court found that the procedural duties of international water law 
also create binding obligations in their own right,10 though it suggested that breach of such 
obligations might not be considered very serious in the absence of actual transboundary harm.11 
The Court highlighted the cascading nature of the procedural obligations, flowing from 
the general duty of States to cooperate which, in the context of planned projects likely to impact 
adversely upon co-riparian States, requires prior notification and, where necessary, consultation 
and negotiation. In order to be adequate, such notification in turn requires some form of 
environmental impact assessment that takes full account of the transboundary effects of the 
project in question.12 Of course, the requirement to conduct transboundary environmental impact 
 
9 See Pulp Mills (n 8) inter alia para 77. Substantive due diligence, on the other hand, might 
involve the adoption and enforcement of national legal requirements regarding water 
pollution prevention, see Pulp Mills (n 8) para 265. See further Owen McIntyre, ‘The 
World Court’s Emphasis on Procedural Rules in the Recent Pulp Mills Case: 
Contributing to the Progressive and Coherent Development of International Water Law’ 
(2011) 4 Water Altern 124, 137. 
10 Pulp Mills (n 8) para 265. 
11 ibid para 269. In denying Argentina’s request for restitution in integrum, the Court considered 
that ‘its finding of wrongful conduct by Uruguay in respect of its procedural obligations 
per se constitutes a measures of satisfaction for Argentina … [a]s Uruguay’s breaches of 
the procedural obligations occurred in the past and have come to an end, there is no cause 
to order their cessation’. 
12 See ibid para 204. 
assessment of planned projects, now recognised as a general requirement under customary 
international law, has parallels in requirements relating to the ongoing exchange of information 
on existing water resources utilisation and its environmental impacts, as suggested by the Court’s 
consistent endorsement of a requirement for continuing environmental impact assessment of 
potentially harmful projects during their operational lifetime.13 Inevitably, procedural obligations 
are very closely linked to the establishment of cooperative institutional mechanisms,14 through 
which formal exchange of information and inter-State dialogue can take place, and by which 
detailed basin-level procedural rules on such exchange can be further elaborated and 
implemented.15 It is hardly coincidental that the rise to prominence of procedural rules of 
international water law, acknowledged by the ICJ in recent times, has been accompanied by a 
proliferation of river basin organisations, boundary waters commissions and similar inter-
governmental institutions having clear responsibility for cooperative management of shared 
water resources.16 This “institutionalisation” of inter-State cooperation over shared water 
 
13 See further (n 103) and (n 104). 
14 See Pulp Mills (n 8) paras 75–77. 
15 See eg the ZAMCOM Procedures for Notification of Planned Measures (2017), available at: 
<http://www.zambezicommission.org/sites/default/files/clusters_pdfs/ZAMCOM-
Procedures-for-Notification-of-Planned-Measures.pdf> (accessed 27 September 2018). 
16 See further Susanne Schmeier, Governing International Watercourses: River Basin 
Organizations and the sustainable governance of internationally shared rivers and lakes 
(Routledge 2013); Ines Dombrowsky, Conflict, Cooperation and Institutions in 
International Water Management: An Economic Analysis (Edward Elgar 2007). 
resources can be understood as reflecting a broader trend in international environmental and 
natural resources law towards a ‘transition from an international law of coexistence to an 
international law of cooperation’.17 
Though the precise nature and application of the judicially recognised obligation in 
general international law to conduct transboundary EIA in respect of potentially harmful projects 
or activities remains in need of some clarification,18 it is clear that it plays a key role in ensuring 
 
17 See Sandrine Maljean-Dubois ‘The Making of International Law Challenging Environmental 
Protection’ in Yann Kerbrat and Sandrine Maljean-Bubois (eds), The Transformation of 
International Environmental Law (A Pedone and Hart 2011) 34–35; See also Owen 
McIntyre, ‘Changing Patterns of International Environmental Law-Making: Addressing 
Normative Ineffectiveness’ in Sandrine Maljean-Dubois (ed), The Effectiveness of 
Environmental Law (Intersentia 2017) 187–220; Owen McIntyre, ‘The making of 
international natural resources law’ in Catherine Brölmann and Yannick Radi (eds), 
Research Handbook on the Theory and Practice of International Law-making (Edward 
Elgar 2016) 442–465. 
18 Despite the Court’s emphatic emphasis in Pulp Mills (n 8) paras 101–105, on the requirement 
to notify a co-riparian State as soon as possible of a project or activity with potential 
transboundary effects, in Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area 
(Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Judgment) [2015] ICJ Rep 665, paras 104–105, the ICJ found 
that EIA precedes and informs the need for notification, which only becomes necessary 
where ‘the environmental impact assessment confirms that there is a risk of significant 
transboundary harm’ and, further, that ‘[i]n light of the absence of risk of significant 
harm, Nicaragua was not required to carry out an environmental impact assessment’. At 
that environmental (and, increasingly, social) considerations relating to a planned or continuing 
use of an international watercourse are adequately understood and communicated. Such 
considerations may therefore be taken properly into account, either as a factor within the 
balancing process that lies at the heart of equitable and reasonable utilisation, or as a key 
component of the procedural due diligence element of the duty to prevent significant 
transboundary environmental harm. In either role transboundary EIA may also facilitate 
application of certain associated principles and approaches of international water and 
environmental law, such as the precautionary principle, thereby allowing these concepts to 
inform the actions of national decision-makers. However, as a “front-loaded” assessment 
mechanism normally employed to inform one-time decision-making processes determining 
whether to permit implementation of a planned project, use or activity, it is not at all clear that 
EIA, at least as currently employed and conducted, is suited to facilitating the kind of flexible 
adaptive management approach which is increasingly regarded as suitable for complex 
 
the same time, in the joined case, Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San 
Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Judgment) [2015] ICJ Rep 665, para 154, the Court 
observed that ‘to conduct a preliminary assessment of the risk posed by an activity is one 
of the ways in which a State can ascertain whether the proposed activity carries a risk of 
significant transboundary harm’, thereby requiring an environmental impact assessment. 
It seems, therefore, that the Court has retreated from its earlier finding, in Pulp Mills (n 8) 
para 105, that a State must inform ‘as soon as it is in possession of a plan which is 
sufficiently developed to permit a preliminary assessment … [or] … at the stage when the 
relevant authority has had the project referred to it with the aim of obtaining initial 
environmental authorization and before the granting of that authorization’. 
ecological systems such as major watercourses.19 Though watercourse States are under an 
ongoing obligation to exchange information on the conditions in the watercourse, this is neither 
sufficiently elaborated in conventional instruments nor developed in practice to ensure effective 
ecosystems protection. 
3 The Ecosystem Approach: the New Paradigm in Transboundary 
Water Management 
Whereas pollution control obligations have long been a central element of international water 
law,20 the modern development of the field has been characterised by growing concern regarding 
the integrated protection of watercourse ecosystems in order to maintain the range of 
indispensable ecosystem services provided thereby. Consider, for example, an influential 2008 
study conducted under the auspices of the Convention on Biological Diversity which noted that 
‘[g]lobally, these [freshwater] ecosystems are in serious decline, due largely to the pressures 
 
19 See eg Barbara Cosens, Lance Gunderson and Brian Chaffin, ‘The Adaptive Water 
Governance Project: Assessing Law, Resilience and Governance in Regional Socio-
Ecological Water Systems Facing Climate Change’ (2014) 51 Ida Law Rev 1, 10; 
Alejandro Iza, Alexandra Müller and Vaéentina Nozz, ‘Adaptive Water Governance: 
Lessons Learned from Implementing an Ecosystem Approach in Mesoamerica’ in 
Kheng-Lian Koh and others (eds), Adaptation to Climate Change: ASEAN and 
Comparative Experiences (World Scientific 2015) 57–81. 
20 See eg Helsinki Rules, Chapter 3: Pollution, International Law Association (ILA), Helsinki 
Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers, ILA, Report of the Fifty-Second 
Conference of the International Law Association (Helsinki 1966). 
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placed upon water by its various users, and the rate of loss of biodiversity in them surpasses that 
from other major biomes by a considerable margin’.21 Such awareness and concern is epitomised 
by the express inclusion in Part IV of the UN Watercourses Convention of an unequivocal 
obligation regarding the protection of watercourse ecosystems,22 in respect of which an 
“ecosystem” has been defined, in a manner consistent with prevailing legal and scientific 
thinking, as an ‘ecological unit consisting of living and non-living components that are 
interdependent and function as a community’,23 thereby including ‘not only the flora and fauna 
in and immediately adjacent to a watercourse, but also the natural features within its catchment 
that have an influence on, or whose degradation could influence, the watercourse’.24 At the same 
time, a clear trend towards State acceptance of obligations of ecosystems protection has long 
been evident globally in the elaboration of the environmental aspects of international water law. 
 
21 Brels, Coates and Loures (n 3) 5. 
22 UN Watercourses Convention, art 20. 
23 ILC, Commentary to the Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of 
its Forty-Sixth Session, UN GAOR 49th Sess, Suppl No 10, UN Doc A/49/10 [1994], 118. 
24 Stephen C McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses: Non-Navigational Uses (OUP 
2001) 393. 
This is apparent in both basin agreements25 and regional framework conventions26 concerning 
shared transboundary water resources.27 The 1992 UNECE Water Convention, one of only two 
globally applicable framework conventions relating to shared international freshwater resources, 
provides a notable example of a formerly regional instrument, setting out extensive and detailed 
provisions for the conservation and restoration of the ecosystems of shared basins.28 Early 
guidelines adopted under the UNECE Water Convention even elaborate upon the meaning and 
implications of the so-called “ecosystem approach”.29 As a framework convention, originally 
applying across the wider European region, the ecosystem protection provisions of the UNECE 
Water Convention have inspired a number of subsequently adopted European river basin 
 
25 See eg Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (22 November 1978) 30 UST 1383, TIAS No 
9257, arts I and II; Agreement on Cooperation for Sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River Basin (5 April 1995) 34 ILM 864, arts 3 and 7. 
26 See eg the original Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the Southern African 
Development Community (28 August 1995) (SADC) arts 2(3), 2(11) and 2(12). 
27 See generally Owen McIntyre, ‘The Emergence of an “Ecosystem Approach” to the Protection 
of International Watercourses under International Law’ (2004) 13 RECIEL 1. 
28 UNECE, Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes (adopted in 1992, entry into force 1996) 1507 UNTS 167, arts 1(2), 
2(2)(b), 2(2)(d) and 3(1)(i). 
29 UN, Guidelines on the Ecosystem Approach in Water Management, (December 1993) UN 
Doc ECE/ENVWA/31. 
agreements, which demonstrate a correspondingly broad commitment to ecosystem protection.30 
Emerging rules on shared international groundwater resources take a similar approach, with the 
International Law Commission (ILC) 2008 Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers stressing 
‘the role of the aquifer or aquifer system in the related ecosystem’ and calling upon States ‘to 
ensure that the quantity and quality of water retained in an aquifer or aquifer system, as well as 
that discharged through its discharge zones, are sufficient to protect and preserve such 
ecosystems’.31 
Article 20 of the UN Watercourses Convention appears, therefore, to recognise an 
autonomous customary obligation to preserve and protect watercourse ecosystems, with the 1994 
ILC commentary confidently declaring that ‘[t]here is ample precedent for the obligation 
contained in article 20 in the practice of States and the work of international organizations’, 
before proceeding to list a wide range of relevant authorities.32 However, the ILC also links the 
obligation to protect the ecosystems of international watercourses to the overarching principle of 
 
30 Including the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine (22 January 1998) arts 2, 3 and 5; the 
Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River 
(29 June 1994) arts 1(c), 2(30) and 2(5); the Agreements on the Protection of the Meuse 
and Scheldt (26 April 1994) art 3; and the Framework Agreement on the Sava River 
Basin (3 December 2002) 2367 UNTS 688, art 11(a). 
31 ILC, 2008 Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, arts 5(1)(i) and 10, Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, II(2) Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission (2008). See also UNECE, Model Rules on Transboundary 
Groundwaters (2014) provision 2.1. 
32 ILC (n 23) 119–121. 
equitable and reasonable utilisation set out in Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, by explaining 
that it ‘is a specific application of the requirement contained in article 5 that watercourse States 
are to use and develop an international watercourse in a manner that is consistent with adequate 
protection thereof’.33 This suggests that ecosystems protection is central to, though by no means 
limited to, determination of equitable and reasonable utilisation, and thus to the allocation of uses 
and quantum share of international waters. The ICJ would appear to have confirmed this position 
over 20 years ago by concluding in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case that (Czecho)Slovakia had 
deprived ‘Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the 
Danube – with the continuing effects of the diversion of these waters on the ecology of the 
riparian area of the Szigetköz’.34 
Growing awareness of and concern for watercourse ecosystems has over time led to ‘the 
adoption of less economic-oriented criteria for the management of freshwater resources, 
following an “ecosystem approach”’.35 Distinguishing this approach from traditional pollution 
control, a seminal early study advises that 
 
 
33 ibid 119. 
34 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 85. 
See further McCaffrey (n 2) 458, who links the obligation to protect watercourse 
ecosystems with the ‘community of interest’ concept, which is inherent to equitable and 
reasonable utilisation. 
35 See Atilla Tanzi and Maurizio Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law or 
International Watercourses (Kluwer Law International 2001) 8–9. 
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an “ecosystem approach” requires consideration of the whole system rather than individual 
components. Living species and their physical environments must be recognized as 
interconnected, and the focus must be on the interaction between different sub-systems and their 
responses to stresses resulting from human activity.36 
 
Beyond the field of international water law, conservation of ecosystems is identified as a key 
objective of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),37 with the fifth meeting of the 
CBD Conference of the Parties (COP) endorsing the “ecosystem approach” as the primary 
framework for action under the Convention, and defining it as ‘a strategy for the integrated 
management of land, water and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use 
in an equitable way’.38 COP 5 also adopted 12 principles to guide the practical implementation of 
the ecosystem approach including, for example: that ‘[c]onservation of ecosystem structure and 
functioning … should be a priority target of the ecosystem approach’ (Principle 5); that 
‘[e]cosystems must be managed within the limits of their functioning’ (Principle 6); and that 
‘[t]he ecosystem approach should be undertaken at the appropriate spatial and temporal scales’ 
(Principle 7).39 
 
36 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, ‘Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: A 
Case for International Ecosystem Law’ (1994) 5 YbIEL 41, 55. 
37 Convention on Biological Diversity (5 June 1992) 1760 UNTS 79, art 1. In addition, art 8(f) 
obliges State parties to “rehabilitate and restore degraded ecosystems”. 
38 See CBD Decision V/6, Ecosystem Approach (22 June 2000) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23. 
39 ibid; See also CBD Decision VII/11 (13 April 2004) UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP.7/21. 
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Though still somewhat underdeveloped in the field of international water law, some 
guidance on the practical application of an ecosystem approach is available under related 
conventional regimes. For example, the Ramsar Convention COP recognised early the 
hydrological, biological and ecological importance of wetlands in the context of a drainage 
basin,40 and subsequently adopted detailed guidelines relevant to the management of river basins, 
including shared international river basins. A notable example is provided by 1999 Guidelines 
for integrating wetland conservation and wise use into river basin management,41 which set out 
detailed recommendations on the conservation of river basin ecosystems, including a dedicated 
section on ‘international cooperation’ concerning ‘special issues related to shared river basin and 
wetland systems’. In 2002 the Ramsar COP adopted Guidelines for the allocation and 
management of water for maintaining the ecological functions of wetlands,42 which are highly 
relevant as international best-practice informing cooperative inter-State allocation of shared 
waters, where such waters are connected to Ramsar designated wetlands. 
Nevertheless, the ecosystem approaches being tentatively adopted within a variety of 
sectoral environmental regimes in international law can still be described as elusive, unstable and 
contested and as ‘responding to two broadly competing logics roughly aligned with what is 
usually referred to as ecocentrism and anthropocentrism’.43 The former involves ‘quite a radical 
 
40 See eg The Criteria for Identifying Wetlands of International Importance, first endorsed by 
Recommendation 4.2 adopted by COP 4 (Montreaux 1990). 
41 Ramsar Convention, Resolution VII.18, COP 7 (San José 1999). 
42 Ramsar Convention, Resolution VIII.1, COP 8 (Valencia 2002). 
43 Vito De Lucia, ‘Competing Narratives and Complex Genealogies: The Ecosystem Approach 
in International Environmental Law’ (2015) 27 J Environ Law 91, 94. See further Vito 
shift’ and resonates with ‘many of the themes central to deep ecology’,44 while the latter, which 
is more in keeping with articulations of the ecosystem approach in current international 
environmental law, views the imperative of ecosystems protection in terms of the need to 
‘preserve the resource base necessary to sustain global production and consumption patterns’.45 
This anthropocentric focus helps to explain why the ecosystem approach ‘is deployed often in 
connection with the conceptual framework of ecosystem services, by some considered one of the 
core elements of EA’.46 Though commentators generally agree that the concept can be 
‘interpreted differently in different contexts’,47 some consensus is emerging regarding certain 
core elements of the ecosystem approach, at least at the scientific level.48 However, it is precisely 
 
De Lucia, ‘Beyond anthropocentrism and ecocentrism: a biopolitical reading of 
environmental law’ (2017) 8(2) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 181–202. 
44 De Lucia, ibid 103–104. 
45 ibid 104 and 106. 
46 ibid 104. 
47 In relation to application of an ecosystems approach in the specific context of the marine 
environment, see Report on the Work of the UN Open-ended Informal Consultative 
Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea at its Seventh Meeting (17 July 2006) UN Doc 
A/61/156, 6. See also Ronán Long, ‘Legal Aspects of Ecosystem-based Marine 
Management in Europe’ (2012) 26 Ocean Yearb 417–484. 
48 See eg Arie Trouwborst, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Ecosystem Approach in 
International Law: Differences, Similarities and Linkages’ (2009) 18 RECIEL 26, 28, 
who relies on Grumbine’s seminal 1994 study, see R Edward Grumbine, ‘What is 
Ecosystem Management?’ (1994) 81 Conserv Biol 27, 31. 
these core elements which present such a challenge for the effectiveness of the procedural rules 
now established in international water law and, in order to understand better the nature of this 
procedural challenge, it is necessary to examine several of these elements in turn. 
3.1 Environmental Flows 
Despite some continuing uncertainty, particular features of an ecosystem approach as applied in 
the specific context of international water law are beginning to come to light. Most notably, 
emerging requirements to maintain minimum environmental flows will play a central role in 
effective implementation of an ecosystem approach in transboundary basins.49 Environmental 
flows are intended to provide ‘a methodological approach that incorporates environmental 
concerns into the process of allocating water rights among different users’,50 where the 
overriding objective ‘is to modify the magnitude and timing of flow releases from water 
infrastructure (e.g. dams) to restore natural or normative flow regimes that benefit downstream 
river reaches and their riparian ecosystems’.51 The concept is defined in a soft-law instrument as 
‘the quantity, timing and quality of water flows required to sustain freshwater and estuarine 
ecosystems and the human livelihoods and well-being that depend on these ecosystems’.52 
 
49 See Owen McIntyre, ‘The Protection of Freshwater Ecosystems Revisited: Towards a 
Common Understanding of the “Ecosystems Approach” to the Protection of 
Transboundary Water Resources’ (2014) 23 RECIEL 88, 90–92. 
50 Brels, Coates and Loures (n 3) 13. 
51 N LeRoy Poff and John H Matthews, ‘Environmental Flows in the Anthropocene: Past 
Progress and Future Prospects’ (2013) 5 Curr Opin Environ Sustain 667, 1. 
52 International Water Centre, The Brisbane Declaration (3–6 September 2007). 
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Though the issue of environmental flows is seldom addressed directly in international water 
instruments, its legal character must be understood as ‘part of a broader notion of taking an 
ecosystem approach’, and so ‘the relevant international instruments are not only those directly 
dealing with water resources, but also those that have a primary focus on the protection of nature 
and ecosystems’.53 
A requirement to maintain minimum environmental flows, derived from more established 
normative principles of international environmental law, received ground-breaking judicial 
support in the Kishenganga Arbitration before a Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal, which 
concluded, on several possible legal grounds, that ‘hydro-electric projects … must be planned, 
built and operated with environmental sustainability [and minimum environmental flow in 
particular] in mind’ on several possible legal grounds.54 At an earlier stage in the proceedings, 
the Tribunal granted Pakistan’s request for interim measures, thereby preventing India from 
conducting any ‘permanent work on or above the riverbed that may inhibit the restoration of the 
full flow of that river to its natural channel’.55 Though the ICJ refused provisional measures in 
respect of Costa Rica’s concerns that dredging of the river and diversion of the water ‘was 
 
53 Megan Dyson, Ger Bergkamp and John Scanlon (eds), Flow: The Essentials of Environmental 
Flows (IUCN 2003) 87–88. 
54 Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v India), PCA Case no 2011-01, Partial 
Award (18 February 2013) paras 450–452 and 454, and Final Award (20 December 
2013). See further Stephen C McCaffrey, ‘International Water Cooperation in the 21st 
Century: Recent Developments in the Law of International Watercourses’ (2014) 23 
RECIEL 4, 5–9; McIntyre (n 49) 91. 
55 Order on Interim Measures (23 September 2011) para 151. 
creating a risk of irreparable prejudice to Costa Rica’s environment or to the flow of the San 
Juan River’, several judicial statements appear to have indirectly recognised the legal 
significance of maintaining flow for ecological purposes.56 A 2011 study assessing State and 
treaty practice notes that ‘[t]he need to provide environmental flows in order to conserve 
ecological integrity of water basins is becoming more and more important’,57 while a 2013 
analysis conducted by a broad coalition of international actors concludes that ‘[t]here is now 
wide recognition of the importance of maintaining an appropriate flow regime to maintain the 
ecological health of river basins’.58 
 
56 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) 
Request for Provisional Measures Order [2011]. See eg Separate Opinion of Judge 
Sepulveda-Amor, para 25; Declaration of Judge Greenwood, para 15. In its 2015 
judgment in this case, the Court appears to have recognised the possibility that 
interference with the flow of a transboundary river, where substantial, could amount to 
significant transboundary harm, supra, (n 18) para 105: ‘the Court finds that the dredging 
programme planned in 2006 was not such as to give rise to a risk of significant 
transboundary harm, either with respect to the flow of the Colorado River or to Costa 
Rica’s wetland’ (emphasis added). 
57 Grethel Aguilar and Alejandro Iza, Governance of Shared Waters: Legal and Institutional 
Issues (IUCN 2011) 99. 
58 Robert Speed and others, Basin Water Allocation Planning: Principles, Procedures and 
Approaches for Basin Allocation Planning (UNESCO 2013) 58. 
As the legal nature of the obligation to maintain flows becomes ever clearer, by means of 
the emerging practice of international courts,59 water convention secretariats,60 and national 
regulators,61 the science is similarly advancing for ‘the quantification of the linkages between 
hydrological processes and components and various ecological variables’.62 Commentators have 
identified certain “guiding elements” for environmental flows, including the need to describe 
flow-ecology and flow-social relationships, the need to engage stakeholders in setting 
environmental water objectives, and the need to integrate environmental flow considerations into 
infrastructure planning and operation.63 Beyond water convention regimes, certain multilateral 
environmental convention secretariats have produced technical guidance on aspects of the 
 
59 See Kishenganga Arbitration (n 54). 
60 See eg Mekong River Commission, ISH Study 0306: Development of Guidelines for 
Hydropower Impact Mitigation and Risk Management in the Lower Mekong Mainstream 
and Tributaries, Vol 2, (MRC, December 2015) 13, 39–40, 82–85, 123–129, 188–192 and 
208–211. 
61 See eg María A Gómez-Balandra, María del Pilar Saldaña-Fabela and Maricela Martínez-
Jiménez, ‘The Mexican Environmental Flow Standard: Scope, Application and 
Implementation’ (2014) 5 J Environ Prot 71–79. 
62 See N LeRoy Poff, Angela H Arthington and Rebecca Elizabeth Tharma, ‘Evolution of 
Environmental Flows Assessment Science, Principles, and Methodologies’ in Avril C 
Horne and others (eds), Water for the Environment: From Policy and Science to 
Implementation and Management (Elsevier 2017) 203. 
63 ibid 225–227. 
calculation and implementation of environmental flow requirements,64 as have leading 
environmental civil society organisations.65 Academic researchers similarly continue to develop 
and refine environmental (or ecological) flow methodologies.66 
3.2 Ecosystem Services 
The overarching objective of an ecosystem approach, and thus of any regime for maintaining 
environmental flows, appears increasingly to centre around the concept of ecosystem services, 
which aims to enhance awareness of the nature and value of socially beneficial services provided 
by natural ecosystems and to provide a methodology for valuation and consideration of such 
services within the decision-making processes of international water law. The 2005 Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment provides an essential typology of four categories of ecosystem services, 
comprising supporting services, provisioning services, regulating services and cultural services,67 
which can assist in transboundary water cooperation by providing watercourse States with a 
common understanding of the costs and benefits for each State of measures for the utilisation and 
 
64 See eg Janine Adams, Determination and Implementations of Environmental Water 
Requirements for Estuaries (Ramsar Convention Secretariat / Secretariat of the CBD, 
2012)<https://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/lib/rtr9-estuaries.pdf > 
(accessed 6 February 2020). 
65 See eg Dyson, Bergkamp and Scanlon (n 53). 
66 See eg Andy D Beaton and Andrea Bradford, ‘Demonstration of a Methodology for Setting 
Ecological Flow and Water Level Targets’ (2013) 38 Can Water Resour J 296. 
67 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Wellbeing: Synthesis (Island 
Press 2005) 39–48. 
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protection of shared watercourse ecosystems. In this way, the ecosystem services concept 
improves the likelihoodprospect of an agreement for benefit-sharing arrangements amongst 
watercourse States, leading to both optimised utilisation and more effective protection of shared 
watercourse ecosystems.68 Similarly, accepted methodologies for valuing ecosystem services 
may facilitate consideration of State responsibility for transboundary ecological harm.69 In either 
role, the ecosystem approach can function, in theory at least, to facilitate the avoidance and 
resolution of inter-State water disputes. 
Despite concerns regarding a ‘lack of attention to ecosystem services within the context 
of transboundary freshwater ecosystems and law’,70 use of such methodologies is becoming 
more common in the practice of transboundary water cooperation. Recognising the direct linkage 
between ecosystem components and services, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) has 
developed an approach to ecosystem management that ‘can involve an assessment of the 
ecosystem components and/or an assessment of the ecosystem services that are derived from the 
 
68 Owen McIntyre, ‘Benefit-sharing and upstream/downstream cooperation for ecological 
protection of transboundary waters: opportunities for China as an upstream State’ (2015) 
40 Water Int 48, 69. 
69 See Owen McIntyre, ‘Responsibility and Liability in International Law for Damage to 
Transboundary Freshwater Resources’ in Mara Tignino, G Pflieger and Chritian Bréthaut 
(eds), Research Handbook on Freshwater Law and International Relations (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, forthcoming 2018) 335. 
70 Alistair Rieu-Clarke and Chris Spray, ‘Ecosystem Services and International Water Law: 
Towards a More Effective Determination and Implementation of Equity’ (2013) 16(2) 
PELJ 12, 13. 
interaction of those components in support of human well-being’.71 Guidance on water resources 
management for the maintenance of ecosystem services has also been developed under the 
auspices of the Ramsar Convention72 and the CBD.73 The CBD Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 
2011–2020 confirms that a key purpose of biodiversity conservation is that of safeguarding 
ecosystem services essential for human well-being and includes a number of targets relating to 
the ecosystem services provided by inland waters.74 An emerging legal obligation to maintain 
ecosystem services is supported by recent statements of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human 
Rights and the Environment framing the issue as a human right of access to ecosystem services.75 
The discourse on ecosystem services is routinely accompanied by discussion of the 
potential role of payment for ecosystem services (PES) and, though this issue ‘is still emerging 
and frankly not well explored in the legal scholarship’,76 key institutional actors in the field of 
 
71 MRC (n 60) 214. 
72 Daniela Russi and others, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) for Water 
and Wetlands (IEEP / Ramsar Secretariat 2013). 
73 CBD, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, CBD Decision VII/4 
(2004), Annex. 
74 CBD, Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, CBD Decision X/2 Annex, para 13. 
75 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, health and sustainable environment (19 January 2017) UN 
Doc A/HRC34/49, 4. 
76 AH Benjamin, ‘Payment for ecosystem services’ (2013) 16(2) PELJ 1. See further Rieu-
Clarke and Spray (n 70). 
transboundary water resources management have seen fit to provide detailed guidance on how 
such payment systems might work,77 with UNECE guidance explaining that 
 
‘Such financing mechanisms operate at many levels, between and within countries, from and to 
governments, the private sector and local communities. Payment for ecosystem services (PES) is 
an innovative tool for rewarding ecosystem managers for their sustainable management practices, 
which increase ecosystem resilience.78 
 
PES can now inform watercourse States’ engagement over shared transboundary waters because 
‘[t]his linkage between the upstream provision of services … and the downstream utilisation of 
services thus provided (often water-related) has now become widely recognised and can be seen 
to operate on very large, often transboundary scales’.79 At any rate, PES arrangements are likely 
in practice to be utilised as one element integrated into the kind of broader benefit-sharing 
arrangements discussed further below. Such arrangements provides a potentially very useful 
means of rebalancing the competing State interests in a shared watercourse giving rise to water 
resources disputes. Leading commentators tend to agree that ‘[i]n most cases, benefit-sharing 
 
77 See eg IUCN, PAY: Establishing payments for watershed services (IUCN 2006). 
78 UNECE, Guidance on water and adaptation to climate change (UNECE 2009). 
79 Rieu-Clarke and Spray (n 70) 25. 
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will require some sort of redistribution or compensation which will be highly situation 
specific’.80 
4 Imminent Challenges in Procedural Engagement 
While the precise normative implications of the ecosystem approach continue to emerge, it is 
accepted that it ‘prioritizes conservation with a view to ensuring ecosystem functioning and 
resilience … [and] … conditions sustainable use to the taking into account of the limits of 
ecosystem functioning and promotes connectivity’.81 Consistent with the overarching 
requirements of international water law, the ecosystem approach outlined under the CBD is also 
understood to emphasise social equity, by identifying and seeking to balance ‘tangible and 
intangible values attached to biodiversity’, and to have a key role in facilitating ‘multilateral 
approaches to fair and equitable benefit-sharing’.82 Therefore, as posited in the introductory 
 
80 Ricard Paisley, ‘Adversaries into partners: International water law and the equitable sharing of 
downstream benefits’ (2002) 3 MJIL 280–300. See further Claudia W Sadoff and David 
Grey, ‘Cooperation on international rivers: A continuum for securing and sharing 
benefits’ (2005) 304 Water Int 420–427; A Dan Tarlock and Patricia Wouters, ‘Are 
shared benefits of international waters an equitable apportionment?’ (2007) 18 Colorado 
J Int Environ Law Pol 523–536. 
81 Elisa Morgera, ‘The Ecosystem Approach and the Precautionary Principle’ in Michael Faure 
(ed), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Environmental Law (Edward Elgar 2017) 70–80. 
82 Elisa Morgera, Multilateral Benefit-Sharing: Whither from Here? (20 June 2016) Benelux 
Project blog-post, available at: 
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section above, the ecosystem approach as applied to the management of shared international 
freshwater resources, and to the resolution of related disputes,. appears to require cooperative 
arrangements that can be adaptive in response to new science and new threats, including that of 
climate change, that rely upon inclusive participatory decision-making, and that facilitate 
complex benefit-sharing with a view to achieving optimal use of international water resources 
and equitable sharing of the benefits associated therewith. However, each of these features 
suggests a level of procedural engagement and multi-party communication for which the 
established procedural rules of international water law are quite inadequate. 
4.1 Adaptive Management 
As regards certain important mechanisms for implementing an ecosystem approach, such as that 
of broad stakeholder participation,83 general international water law appears as yet rather 
underdeveloped. This is particularly true of the paradigm of adaptive management, which is 
increasingly regarded as central to effective application of an ecosystem approach,84 and 
 
http://www.benelexblog.law.ed.ac.uk/2016/06/20/multilateral-benefit-sharing-whither-
from-here/; See also CBD Decision V/6 (n 38). 
83 See further infra. 
84 See eg CBD Secretariat Guidelines (n 38) 1, which state: “The ecosystem approach requires 
adaptive management to deal with the complex and dynamic nature of ecosystems and 
the absence of complete knowledge or understanding of their functioning. Ecosystem 
processes are often non-linear, and the outcome of such processes often shows time-lags. 
The result is discontinuities, leading to surprise and uncertainty. Management must be 
adaptive in order to be able to respond to such uncertainties and contain elements of 
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involves a strategy that is ‘iterative and flexible, responsive to the constantly changing conditions 
of both complex ecosystem processes and available scientific knowledge’.85 Adaptive 
management is necessary to cope with fundamental uncertainty regarding the functioning of 
complex dynamic socio-ecological systems, the value of certain ecosystems and their services, 
and the potential effects of certain policies and projects on the functioning of ecosystems.86 We 
might expect such uncertainty to be exacerbated, and adaptive strategies to become ever more 
necessary, in light of the threat of climate variability to freshwater ecosystems.87 Stated simply, 
adaptive management seeks to ensure the “resilience” of an ecosystem, i.e. ‘the ability of a 
system to cope with inevitable changes [which] is, thus, the precondition for the health of that 
 
‘learning-by-doing’ or research feedback. Measures may need to be taken even when 
some cause-and-effect relationships are not yet fully established scientifically.” 
85 De Lucia (n 43) 93. 
86 Elina Raitanen, ‘Legal Weaknesses and Windows of Opportunity in Transnational 
Biodiversity Protection: As Seen Through the Lens of an Ecosystem Approach-Based 
Paradigm’ in Sandrine Maljean-Dubois (ed), The Effectiveness of International Law 
(Intersentia 2017) 81, 93. 
87 See J McDonald and MC Styles, ‘Legal Strategies for Adaptive Management under Climate 
Change’ (2014) 26(1) Journal of Environmental Law 25–53; JB Ruhl, ‘Climate Change 
Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law’ (2010) 40 Environ 
Law 343. 
system’,88 by adopting a systematic approach for adapting and improving natural resources 
management by learning from previous management interventions.89 
However, beyond the intrinsic flexibility of the normatively indeterminate principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation, incorporation of adaptive measures into conventional 
systems of legal rules is problematic, largely due to traditional prioritization of the stability of 
legal regimes over their flexibility, especially where such regimes are intended to facilitate 
investment in large-scale water infrastructure. Thus, States are reluctant to surrender sovereign 
control of shared water resources to the kind of joint institutions that would necessarily be 
charged with implementing adaptive management.90 As limited exceptions to the rule, the 1996 
Farraka Treaty91 and the 2002 Incomati-Maputo Agreement92 can be cited as rare examples of 
 
88 Raitanen (n 86) 93. See further A Dan Tarlock, ‘The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and 
the Partial Unravelling of Environmental Law’ (1994) 3 Loy LA L Rev 1123. 
89 Byron K Williams, ‘Adaptive Management of Natural Resources: Frameworks and Issues’ 
(2011) 92 J Environ Manage 1339, 1346–1353. 
90 See Michelle Lim, ‘Is Water Different from Biodiversity? Governance Criteria for the 
Effective Management of Transboundary Resources’ (2014) 23 RECIEL 96–110. See 
further A Dan Tarlock, ‘Four Challenges of International Water Law’ (2010) 23 TELJ 
369, 383–384. 
91 Treaty on Sharing of the Ganga Waters at Farakka (New Delhi, 12 December 1996) arts II and 
X. 
92 Tripartite Interim Agreement for Cooperation on the Protection and Sustainable Utilisation of 
the Water Resources of the Incomati and Maputo Watercourses (Johannesburg, 29 
August 2002) art 10 and Annex I. 
agreements that create mechanisms for the mutually agreed adjustment of flows during times of 
drought and flooding.93 However, traditional legal frameworks for natural resources management 
tend to be ‘based on historic conditions and linear patterns of change’, whereas ‘[t]he complex 
and uncertain dynamics of interconnected ecosystems and social systems … require that resource 
regulators and managers have a certain amount of discretion’,94 something that is not often 
afforded to cooperative transboundary institutions (where they exist) by sovereign watercourse 
States. 
The procedural rules of international water law are most firmly established, and most 
highly elaborated, in respect of planned measures, where conventional instruments provide for 
inter-State notification and, where necessary, for structured consultation and negotiation.95 
Clearly, the outcomes traditionally produced by inter-State procedural engagement in respect of 
such large-scale water-related utilisation or infrastructure projects have sought to ensure legal 
stability above all else. This is evident from judicial recognition of the significant role played in 
the effective implementation of such procedural engagement by environmental impact 
assessment (EIA), itself a one-time, front-loaded process which assumes the possibility of 
predicting and mitigating adverse impacts well in advance of the commencement of a project.96 
 
93 See Lim (n 90) 105–6. 
94 Raitanen (n 86) 95. 
95 Consider, eg, the detailed provisions contained in Part III of the UN Watercourses Convention. 
See also, the detailed procedures and guidelines adopted under the auspices of several 
basin agreements, such as the ZAMCOM Procedures for Notification of Planned Measures 
(23 February 2017). 
96 See Pulp Mills (n 8) para 204. 
Therefore, legal frameworks for transboundary cooperation must evolve to create suitably 
empowered and capacitated institutions employing highly sophisticated procedures for inter-
State engagement over shared water resources. Legal arrangements reflecting such an approach 
would accommodate uncertainty through flexible decision-making procedures which permit 
‘incremental and gradual changes that transition experimentally to new standards or 
arrangements, while monitoring, assessing and adjusting these changes and their effects’.97 
Though this will present significant challenges for the procedural and institutional 
arrangements currently prevailing in international water law, the requirement for adaptive 
resilience governance is not without some legal authority. Strong links exist between adaptive 
management and the precautionary principle, as both seek to accommodate scientific 
uncertainty98 and the former can be regarded as a means of implementing the latter,99 which 
enjoys extensive support as customary law.100 The inverse is also true. Precaution is commonly 
understood to be an integral aspect of the application of the ecosystem approach, which can itself 
in turn be legally justified as a precautionary measure.101 Of course, the ecosystem approach may 
already enjoy autonomous legal authority, at least in the field of international watercourses.102 
 
97 Raitanen (n 86) 96. 
98 Robert Kundis Craig, ‘“Stationarity is Dead” – Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for 
Climate Change Adaptation Law’ (2010) 34 Harv Envtl L Rev 9, 46–48. 
99 Raitanen (n 86) 97. 
100 See eg Owen McIntyre and Thomas Mosedale, ‘The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of 
Customary International Law’ (1997) 9 J Environ Law 221–241. 
101 See Trouwborst (n 48) 26. 
102 ibid 30. 
Consistent ICJ endorsement in transboundary watercourses cases of a requirement for 
‘continuing’ environmental assessment might be taken to amount to judicial recognition of the 
important role of adaptive ecosystem-based management in certain situations of scientific 
uncertainty. The Court stated unequivocally in the Pulp Mills case, for example, that ‘once 
operations have started and, where necessary, throughout the life of the project, continuous 
monitoring of its effects on the environment shall be undertaken’,103 thereby building upon 
Weeramantry’s earlier endorsement in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros of the “Principle of Continuing 
Environmental Impact Assessment”.104 
4.2 Broad Stakeholder Participation 
 
103 Pulp Mills (n 8) para 205. See further Owen McIntyre, ‘The World Court’s Emphasis on 
Procedural Rules in the Recent Pulp Mills Case: Contributing to the Progressive and 
Coherent Development of International Water Law’ (2011) 4 Water Altern 124, 142. 
104 See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case (n 34) Separate Opinion of Judge Weeeramantry, paras 
108–110. See also Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with 
Paragraph 63 of the Court, Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New 
Zealand v France) (Judgment) [1995] ICJ Rep 457, 344; Legality of the Use by a State of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 66, 140. 
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Though Rio Principle 10 proclaims a general principle of public participation,105 which is equally 
applicable to the management of shared transboundary water resources106 and might reasonably 
be considered to reflect established customary international law,107 international water 
agreements which include an express requirement concerning the involvement of stakeholders or 
the wider public are relatively rare. In this regard, international water law appears out of step 
with the advice of the community of water experts108 and with developments in general 
international law. It is worth noting, for example, that Article 13 of the International Law 
Commission’s 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities includes an obligation to consult affected populations within any process facilitating 
transboundary EIA, and the commentary thereto makes it quite clear that, in addition to the 
 
105 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (14 June 1992) UN Doc 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1. 
106 See eg Carl Bruch, ‘Evolution of Public Involvement in International Watercourse 
Management’ in Carl Bruch and others (eds), Public Participation in Governance of 
International Freshwater Resources (UNU Press 2005) 21–22, 28. 
107 See eg Jona Razzaque, ‘Information, public participation and access to justice in 
environmental matters’ in Shawkat Alam and others (eds), Routledge Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (Routledge 2012) 140; Jonas Ebbesson, ‘Principle 10: 
Public Participation’ in Jorge E. Viñuales (ed), The Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development: A Commentary (OUP 2015) 287. 
108 On the significance of meaningful public participation for effective basin management, see eg 
Paul A Sabatier and others (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches to 
Watershed Management (MIT Press 2005). 
provision of information to the public, it would require States ‘to ascertain the view of the 
public’ likely to be affected, as ‘[w]ithout that second step, the purpose of the article would be 
defeated’.109 
Conventional international water law’s focus upon inter-State engagement to the 
exclusion of meaningful public participation is epitomised by Part III of the UN Watercourses 
Convention, containing detailed rules on all aspects of inter-State notification of planned 
measures, reply to such notification and, where necessary, consultation and negotiation 
concerning such measures.110 Similarly, Article 9 of the Convention only provides for the regular 
exchange of data and information at the inter-State level, neglecting to say anything about public 
or stakeholder access. Though the UNECE Water Convention is often regarded as ‘arguably 
leading the charge on producing instruments which strengthen joint institutions and stakeholder 
participation’,111 the Convention itself only requires State parties to make information relating to 
 
109 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session (23 April – 
1 June and 2 July to 10 August 2001) UN Doc A/56/10, 165. See further Owen McIntyre, 
‘The Proceduralisation and Growing Maturity of International Water Law’ (2011) 22 J 
Environ Law 475, 496–497. 
110 Arts 11–19 are widely regarded as the Convention’s greatest contribution to the corpus of 
rules comprising international water law. 
111 Ruby Moynihan, ‘Inland water biodiversity: international law on protection of transboundary 
freshwater ecosystems and biodiversity’ in Elisa Morgera and Jona Razzaque (eds), 
Biodiversity and Nature Protection Law (Edward Elgar 2017) 200. See further Ruby 
Moynihan and Bjørn‐Oliver Magsig, ‘The Rising Role of Regional Approaches in 
the management of transboundary freshwater resources available to the public112 and says little 
about public participation. Some European basin agreements inspired by the UNECE Water 
Convention have tended to take a similarly restrictive approach as regards public or stakeholder 
participation,113 whilst others have sought to be more inclusive.114 There also exist a limited 
number of basin agreements from other regions, most notably in Africa, which expressly 
stipulate a requirement of public consultation, such as the 2004 ZAMCOM Agreement115 and the 
2003 Lake Tanganyika Convention.116 
 
International Water Law: Lessons from the UNECE Water Regime and Himalayan Asia 
for Strengthening Transboundary Water Cooperation’ (2014) 23 RECIEL 43–58. 
112 UNECE Water Convention (n 28) art 16. 
113 See eg the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube 
River (Sophia, 29 June 1994) art 14. 
114 See eg the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine (Bern, 12 April 1999) art 14, which 
provides for NGO s to act as observers, make submissions and enter into consultations 
with the Commission. 
115 See eg the Agreement on the Establishment of the Zambezi Water Commission (Kasane, 13 
July 2004) art 16(8) of which provides that: ‘Member States shall ensure that the Public 
in an area likely to be affected by a proposed programme, project or activity are informed 
thereof and are provided with the opportunity for making comments thereon or objections 
thereto as well as on the transmittal of such comments or objections to the Commission’. 
116 See eg the Convention on Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika (Dar es Salaam, 12 
June 2003), which in addition to setting out ‘the principle of participation’ in art 5(2)(d), 
Public participation is clearly recognised as central to the ecosystem approach in the 
practice developed under the CBD. Of the 12 principles identified by CBD COP 5 to guide 
implementation of the ecosystem approach, Principle 12 recommends the involvement of all 
sectors of society, while Principle 11 exhorts decision-makers to make use of all forms of 
information, including indigenous knowledge.117 Similarly, Goal 2.5 of the CBD’s Revised 
Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity recommends that 
 
Relevant national stakeholders, including representatives of indigenous and local communities, are 
involved, as far as appropriate, in the policy-making and in the planning, implementation and 
monitoring of the implementation of the programme of work.118 
 
Likewise, the 2004 guidelines on implementing the ecosystem approach adopted by CBD COP 7 
‘[r]ecommend that Parties and other Governments facilitate the full and effective participation of 
indigenous and local communities and other stakeholders’.119 
 
includes a detailed art 17 dedicated to ‘Public Participation in Decision Making 
Processes’. 
117 CBD Decision V/6 (n 38). 
118 CBD Decision VII/4 (2004) Annex, 22. 
119 CBD Decision VII/11 (n 39) 2, para 10. 
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Despite a dearth of treaty practice expressly providing for public participation in respect 
of shared international waters, many treaty regimes either require120 or promote121 reliance upon 
frameworks for EIA of planned projects in order to avoid and minimise adverse impacts and to 
facilitate meaningful inter-State notification. At any rate, the ICJ has described the obligation to 
conduct an EIA in respect of a major project likely to impact an international watercourse as a 
‘requirement under general international law’,122 thereby suggesting that its inclusion in an 
applicable conventional instrument isn’t required. Whilst recognising a requirement for 
transboundary EIA in Pulp Mills, the Court found that ‘no legal obligation to consult the affected 
populations arises for the Parties from the instruments invoked by Argentina’.123 However, the 
Court appears to have been addressing a quite specific argument put to it in international law, as 
it also held that ‘it is for each State to determine in its domestic legislation … the specific content 
of the environmental impact assessment required in each case’.124 The Court thus makes it clear 
that States should rely on their domestic EIA regimes, which are universally in place around the 
world, in giving effect to their international obligation to conduct EIA. While the domestic EIA 
 
120 See eg the Lake Tanganyika Convention (n 116) art 15. 
121 Article 12 of the UN Watercourses Convention notably suggests that ‘notification shall be 
accompanied by available technical data and information, including the results of any 
environmental impact assessment, in order to enable the notified States to evaluate the 
possible effects of the planned measures’; See also, the ILC Draft Articles on 
Transboundary Aquifers (n 31) art 15(2). 
122 Pulp Mills (n 8) para 204. See further McIntyre (n 103) 141. 
123 ibid Pulp Mills, para 216. 
124 ibid para 205. 
regimes everywhere in place provide ‘an almost universally accepted framework methodology 
for studying and communicating precisely those contentious aspects of a planned project or 
activity which are necessary for effective decision making’,125 one would struggle to find such a 
national regime where public or stakeholder participation is not a central element. It is telling, for 
example, that the 1991 UNECE Convention on Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 
which is primarily intended to inform the development at the national level of ‘the necessary 
legal, administrative or other measures’ in respect of activities likely to cause significant adverse 
transboundary impact, requires that ‘[t]he concerned Parties shall arrange for distribution of the 
documentation to the authorities and the public of the affected Party in the areas likely to be 
affected and for the submission of comments to the competent authority of the Party of origin’.126 
In addition, a significant number of international watercourses have in place permanent 
institutional structures, many of which assist in facilitating structured stakeholder engagement. 
As one commentator has noted, ‘practice shows that effective institutional management has a 
degree of flexibility that allows for public input’.127 A detailed study from 2013 has shown that, 
 
125 McIntyre (n 109) 496. 
126 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (signed 25 
February 1991, entered into force 10 September 1997) 1989 UNTS 309. It is worth noting 
that the activities listed in Appendix I to the Convention as requiring EIA of their 
transboundary effects include inland waterways and ports, large dams and reservoirs, 
large-scale groundwater abstraction activities, large-scale pulp and paper manufacturing, 
major mining operations, and deforestation of large areas – all activities likely to have a 
significant ecological impact upon a major watercourse. 
127 Lim (n 90) 104. 
at that time, there existed 117 river basin organisations (RBO s) covering 116 transboundary rivers 
out of a global total of 263.128 The same study notes that ‘RBO s do not act in isolation in their 
respective river and lake basins’, but instead engage a range of external actors, including ‘NGO s, 
civil society groups, knowledge groups and research networks … as well as other regional 
institutions either directly dealing with water resources issues … or implicitly influencing river 
basin governance through their regional principles, norms, rules and activities’.129 This is 
important for effective ecosystems protection, and leading commentators note that 
 
effective governance requires a bottom-up approach, and one that often sits more easily with non-
governmental organisations, working at the interface between state and society. Such “trusted 
intermediaries” can often work across national or sub-national boundaries with a greater flexibility 
than state bodies, building local consensus around environmental protection and enhancement, and 
ultimately ecosystem service delivery.130 
 
However, if one accepts that effective public or stakeholder participation is crucial for the 
protection and preservation of watercourse ecosystems, and thus for achieving optimal and 
sustainable utilisation of international watercourses and, by implication, for the avoidance or 
resolution of international water disputes, it is quite clear that the prevailing paradigm for 
 
128 Schmeier (n 16) 65. 
129 ibid 108. 
130 Rieu-Clarke and Spray (n 70) 46. 
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procedural engagement in international water law, with its almost exclusive focus on inter-State 
communication, is not fit for purpose. In its discussion of the ‘Effectiveness of Public 
Participation in Decision Making’ regarding shared international water resources, the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment chapter on Freshwater Ecosystems provides an indication of 
the inherent complexity of the participation issues potentially arising, noting that 
 
It may be limited by factors such as: geographic isolation, common in upper watershed areas; 
language and educational barriers; access to information that is timely and relevant; whether 
participation is made possible in the early phases of a process (planning and defining problems); 
whether the decision process provides an opportunity for deliberation and learning; and legal 
frameworks that define rights (land tenure, for example) and provide measures of recourse, all of 
which determine the relative bargaining power of various stakeholders.131 
 
 
131 B Aylward and others, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Chapter 7 – Freshwater 
Ecosystem Services, 227, available at 
<https://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.312.aspx.pdf>(accessed 
27 September 2018). 
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While participatory rights are developing rapidly within the related fields of human rights law132 
and environmental law,133 it is clear that implementation of the ecosystem approach will demand 
significant progressive advances in terms of the inclusiveness of the procedural rules employed 
in international water law. 
4.3 Benefit-Sharing Arrangements 
Greater focus in the practice of international water diplomacy and law on the concept of 
ecosystems services, and on closely related obligations regarding environmental flows, as well as 
greater understanding and acceptance of the methodologies involved in each, raises the prospect 
of more extensive reliance upon so-called “benefit-sharing” arrangements in order to optimise 
beneficial use of ever-scarcer water resources whilst maintaining watercourse ecosystem 
integrity.134 Such benefit-sharing arrangements would typically involve some form of payments 
 
132 Rieu-Clarke and Spray (n 70) 48. See further Owen McIntyre, ‘The Role of the Public and the 
Human Right to Water’ in Mara Tignino and Komlan Sangbana (eds), Public 
Participation and Water Resources Management: Where Do We Stand in International 
Law? (UNESCO 2015) 139–146. 
133 As epitomised by the UNECE Arhus Convention on Accession to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 
(Aarhus, 25 June 1998) 38 ILM 517 (1999) and by the new Regional Agreement on 
Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Escazú, 4 March 2018), which opened for signature on 27 
September 2018. 
134 See generally McIntyre (n 68). 
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for benefits, or payments for costs associated with enhanced stewardship of a shared 
transboundary watercourse normally taken by an upstream State.135 The ecosystem services 
concept provides a structured methodology for the economic and social valuation of the benefits 
of watercourse ecosystems, including non-marketable benefits, and can thus permit their 
integration into benefit-sharing arrangements. Similarly, the PES paradigm may have a key 
facilitating role to play where the benefit to the optimised, and in lieu of which compensation 
would be owed to another (most likely upstream) State as part of a benefit-sharing arrangement, 
is that of ecological integrity and/or the ecosystem services accruing from a functioning 
transboundary riverine ecosystem. Leading commentators have noted that such methodologies 
for the identification and valuation of benefits provided by international watercourse ecosystems, 
where widely accepted, can help to provide ‘a common point of departure’ for negotiations over 
benefit-sharing.136 In other words, 
 
the difficult task of crafting complex benefit-sharing arrangements focused on ecosystem 
protection, including arrangements to compensate the upstream States concerned, might now be 
more possible than before due to the sophisticated tools and methodologies emerging under the 
“ecosystem approach” to transboundary water management.137 
 
 
135 See further Sadoff and Grey (n 80). 
136 ibid; see McIntyre (n 68) 60. 
137 McIntyre ibid 72. 
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The potential of such sophisticated arrangements for the avoidance and/ or resolution of inter-
State water disputes is obvious. 
However, it is nevertheless clear that ‘the difficult task of crafting complex benefit-
sharing arrangements’, as well as their effective implementation and management over time, will 
require an ongoing regime of intense and highly technical inter-State engagement which is 
utterly beyond the capacity of the currently established procedural rules of international water 
law. The practice of benefit-sharing with respect to international watercourses is widely 
understood to have its origins in a 1961 treaty concluded between Canada and the United States 
which provided for the construction and operation of three infrastructure projects on the 
Colombia river located within Canadian territory, but designed to maximise benefits in the 
United States.138 The treaty relates to hydropower generation, irrigation and flood control, whilst 
also providing for corresponding compensation payments to Canada. The process of negotiating 
the original treaty was lengthy and complex. Negotiations were facilitated by the International 
Joint Commission established under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty,139 but also required the 
establishment of the International Columbia River Engineering Board, which in turn set up an 
 
138 Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River 
Basin (17 January 1961) 15 UST 1555, 543 UNTS 244. Renegotiation of the Treat 
commenced in May 2018 and was ongoing at the time of writing. See 
<https://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/ca/topics/c78892.htm>(accessed 29 January 2019). 
139 Treaty relating to the Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising Along the Boundary between 
the United States and Canada, UN Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions (1909) 
ST/LEG/SerB/12, 260. 
Engineering Committee which had responsibility for ‘obtaining data and analysing the situation’ 
and carried out a series of extensive studies on the basin.140 This experience strongly suggests 
that, ‘due to the novelty of benefit-sharing as a cooperative paradigm and the inherent 
complexity of the considerations and calculations involved, a sophisticated legal and institutional 
framework for cooperation would be required for formulating related proposals’.141 Indeed, in 
contrastmparing the relative success of the benefit-sharing regime in the Colombia basin with the 
problems experienced in attempts to introduce benefit-sharing in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya 
basins, commentators have blamed the lack of effective binding procedural requirements and 
competent institutional arrangements for water cooperation in Central Asia.142 
On the basis of detailed case studies of benefit-sharing arrangements around the world, 
commentators have emphasised the critical importance of structured engagement with all 
stakeholders and of the related ‘instititionalization’ of transboundary water cooperation,143 and 
further stress 
 
The need for long-term commitment: The coherent management of trans-boundary watercourses 
cannot be introduced over short time periods, in any geography. Activities such as encouraging 
 
140 See further Paisley (n 81). 
141 McIntyre (n 68) 51. 
142 Tarlock and Wouters (n 81). 
143 D Phillips and others, Trans-Boundary Water Co-operation as a Tool for Conflict Prevention 
and Broader Benefit Sharing (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden: Global Development 
Studies No 4, Stockholm 2006) 172. 
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desecuritization, addressing sovereignty and building trust amongst co-riparians require significant 
time ….144 
 
Therefore, benefit-sharing arrangements focused on the preservation of watercourse ecosystems 
and the maintenance of ecosystem services will require highly capacitated, permanent 
institutions capable of facilitating intense ongoing procedural engagement between watercourse 
States. The currently established legal and institutional frameworks for cooperation have largely 
evolved to facilitate “one-time” notification, consultation and negotiation in respect of the 
unilateral implementation of large-scale infrastructure or water utilisation projects. To date, such 
inter-State engagement has tended to be based upon front-loaded technical assessments of the 
impacts of the planned projects in question and of the interests of the States concerned, which are 
intended to inform national permitting decisions. 
5 Conclusion 
The emergence of wide-ranging ecosystems obligations within international water law was 
always likely to have profound implications for the structure and composition of this corpus of 
rules, which has until relatively recently served primarily to accommodate competing economic 
uses of shared international freshwater resources. However, as the normative parameters of the 
far-reaching ecosystem approach as applied to transboundary waters continue to take shape, the 
true nature and extent of these implications are becoming clearer. While the rather normatively 
indeterminate substantive rules of international water law, encompassing both the principle of 
 
144 ibid 182. 
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equitable and reasonable utilisation and the duty to prevent significant transboundary harm,145 
would appear to enjoy the inherent flexibility to accommodate ecological interests and concerns, 
it is the procedural rules which may struggle in this regard. Though the detailed and 
unambiguous procedural rules set out in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention have largely 
been regarded by lawyers in this field as the Convention’s crowning achievement, it is 
increasingly apparent that the technical approaches and methodologies being developed to 
provide the ecosystem approach with normative meaning and to facilitate its practical 
implementation in the specific context of shared waters represent a significant challenge to 
established patterns of inter-State communication and engagement. 
First of all, the requirement to adopt a precautionary ecosystem approach incorporating, 
where relevant, elements of adaptive management, along with the related requirement to engage 
in continuing environmental impact assessment, experimentation and monitoring, suggests the 
need for much more sophisticated and intense inter-State procedural engagement, ensuring 
continuing communication of the results of structured and targeted monitoring, modelling and 
research. Secondly, the participatory decision-making regarded as central to the adoption of an 
ecosystem approach will require a shift away from the current exclusive focus on inter-State 
communication and towards procedural frameworks that ensure effective and meaningful 
engagement with key stakeholders and the public. The modalities of such consultation with 
stakeholders and the public are very much more complex, particularly at the transboundary level, 
and appropriate procedural frameworks will require a sophisticated approach, drawing on lessons 
 
145 See further Owen McIntyre, ‘Substantive Rules of International Water Law’ in A Rieu-
Clarke, Alistair Allen and Sarah Hendry (eds), Routledge Handbook of Water Law and 
Policy (Routledge 2017) 234–246. 
learned in such fields as human rights, to ensure open and equitable accessibility, transparency 
and participation. Finally, the ever more urgent imperative of ensuring optimal and sustainable 
use of increasingly scarce water resources, combined with the emergence of elaborate 
ecosystem-based methodologies for identifying and valuing water-related interests and benefits, 
will encourage States to resort more to complex benefit-sharing arrangements in the cooperative 
management of shared water resources. Such arrangements will also demand a sophistication in 
the supporting rules and mechanisms for procedural engagement which is quite unlike anything 
available among today’s established procedural frameworks. 
The emerging ecosystem approach offers the prospect of a new water resources 
management paradigm which can assist watercourse States to avoid, or at least to work towards 
resolving, the international water-related disputes which are more likely to arise in an 
increasingly water-scarce world. However, its effective deployment will require a significant 
upgrading of the supporting procedural rules of international water law. 
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